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Abstract
This paper examines how UK banks channel capital inflows to the individual sectors of the
domestic economy and to overseas residents. Information on the source country of foreign capital
deposited with UK banks allows us to construct a novel Bartik instrument for capital inflows.
Our results suggest that foreign funds boost bank lending to the domestic economy. This result
is due to the positive effect of capital inflows on bank lending to non-financial firms and to other
domestic financial institutions. Banks do not channel capital inflows directly to households or
the public sector. Much of the foreign capital is also channeled back abroad, reflecting the role
of the UK as a global financial center.
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1. Introduction
Large and volatile capital flows have become an important feature of the global financial
system since the 1990s. Capital inflows have funded productive investment in recipient countries
but they have also driven credit booms and asset price bubbles, forcing costly adjustments when
funding was withdrawn and flows reversed.1 In many advanced economies, the largest and most
volatile component of these flows are “other investment flows” - the foreign capital which flows into
banks and other financial institutions. But where do these funds ultimately go ? How financial
institutions use the foreign capital and which sectors they channel the funds to has important
implications for the real economy. The allocation of foreign funds by financial institutions may
determine which sectors of the economy are prone to credit booms or face refinancing risks when
funding dries up. Foreign funding can also shape the economic structure of recipient countries as
financial intermediaries adjust the composition of their loan portfolios to match the currency and
maturity profile of their funding base.
This paper traces out the path of foreign capital to the various sectors of the UK economy.
We study bank balance sheets to assess how banks channel foreign capital to the individual sectors
of the domestic economy and to foreign counterparties. Despite the importance of the allocation of
foreign funding across sectors in shaping the nature of credit booms and busts and in influencing the
structure of the domestic economy, evidence on the ultimate recipients of capital inflows is scarce.
Several studies document the relationship between capital inflows and lending growth for specific
sectors of the economy such as the corporate sector (Baskaya, Di Giovanni, Kalemli-Özcan, Peydró,
and Ulu (2017a); Igan and Tan (2017)) or residential housing (Sá, Towbin, and Wieladek (2014)).
Our paper provides a more comprehensive picture of the allocation of foreign funds by tracing capital
inflows to all economic sectors.
To track foreign capital, we examine detailed, quarterly balance sheet data of UK-resident
banks for the period from 1998Q1 to 2016Q4.2 Banks’ balance sheets are an ideal source for studying
the allocation of foreign funds given that banks are recipients of large capital inflows but also
1See for example evidence by Mendoza and Terrones (2012); Calderon and Kubota (2012); Lane and McQuade
(2014); Elekdag and Wu (2013); Ghosh, Ostry, and Qureshi (2016) on the relationship between capital inflows and
credit booms. For evidence on the relationship between capital inflows and asset prices, see for example Sá, Towbin,
and Wieladek (2014); Taguchi, Sahoo, and Nataraj (2015); Tillmann (2013).
2We use the phrase “UK banks” or “banks in the UK” as a shorthand for UK-resident banks in the remainder of
the paper.
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providers of credit to the rest of the economy. We examine the effect of capital inflows on bank
lending to domestic households, firms, the public sector, banks and other financial institutions, and
on lending to non-residents. Within the household sector we differentiate between mortgage and
consumer credit. We also study the industry breakdown of lending to the corporate sector.
To establish causality between capital inflows and bank lending to individual sectors we
introduce a novel instrument for capital inflows into banks. Foreign funding may not be randomly
allocated across banks in the UK and could be endogenous to bank lending. Some banks might for
example attract foreign funding in order to meet higher demand for credit by their customer base.
Improved growth prospects of a sector could boost lending growth but also lead to larger capital
inflows. To address these endogeneity issues, we construct a Bartik instrument for capital inflows
similar to the instrument for labor inflows that is widely used in the migration literature to examine
local effects of immigration in host countries (e.g. Card (2005); Cortes (2008); Sá (2016)).
To construct our instrument, we exploit detailed data about the country of origin of the
foreign capital that is deposited with each of the UK banks in our sample. The instrument uses
information about the historical distribution of funding from a foreign country across UK banks to
allocate subsequent capital inflows from this country across recipient UK banks. The instrument
for capital inflows into bank b over the quarter is therefore determined by two components: first,
capital inflows from the depositor countries of bank b which flow into the entire UK banking sector
during that quarter; and second, the historical share of funds from these countries which were
deposited with bank b during some initial period. Neither of these components should affect bank
lending, other than through their effect on capital inflows into individual banks. The historical
distribution of foreign funding has predictive power for the subsequent allocation of foreign capital
across UK banks. This is due to branching and subsidiary networks of UK-resident banks abroad
which facilitate transactions with particular UK banks, and due to intragroup flows and persistent
ties between foreign depositors and UK banks.
As a global financial center with a large and sophisticated domestic credit market, the UK
provides a suitable testing ground to study the relationship between capital inflows and sectoral
lending. The UK hosts a large and heterogeneous set of banks with headquarters in different countries
around the world. Banks have large external liabilities and are therefore sensitive to movements in
funding from abroad. Figure 1 shows that UK banks’ external liabilities increased rapidly in the
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2000s, peaked at almost 230% of GDP at the beginning of 2008 and contracted sharply when foreign
capital was withdrawn during the Global Financial Crisis. Within two quarters external liabilities
fell by 35% of annualized GDP, squeezing banks’ balance sheets. The banking sector deleveraged
over much of the post-crisis period, a process which was only reversed in 2016. In mid-2018, gross
external liabilities of financial institutions in the UK amounted to 144% of GDP. Large withdrawals
of foreign capital or failure to refinance these external liabilities could lead to a tightening of domestic
credit conditions, and would likely hit those sectors which benefitted most from capital inflows. Such
a shock could be cushioned by a repatriation of UK banks’ assets abroad. However, during most
of the period that we study, the banking sector in the UK was a net borrower from the rest of the
world and external liabilities exceeded external assets.
Figure 2 shows the substantial gross inflows into financial institutions resident in the UK
which contributed to the build-up of these stocks. Around the time of the Global Financial Crisis,
inflows and outflows of foreign capital reached record highs of nearly 100% of quarterly GDP. But
flows were also large in non-crisis times such as the first half of the 2000s. These aggregate flows
mask substantial heterogeneity across UK banks which are important in determining credit outcomes.
Aggregate capital inflows can coincide with individual UK banks experiencing withdrawals of foreign
funding and this can reduce credit availability for particular sectors of the domestic economy. This
underscores the need to analyze capital flow data at the level of the individual bank rather than at
the country-level.
Our results for the period 2001Q1-2016Q4 suggest that capital inflows boost bank lending
to the domestic economy. We find that an increase in capital inflows equal to one percent of a
bank’s total liabilities is associated with an increase in domestic credit growth by 0.8 percentage
points. This is driven by lending to the corporate sector and lending to other domestic financial
institutions.3 A closer look at the composition of lending to different UK industries shows that
capital inflows have a large positive effect on lending to the construction sector but not on lending
to other industries. Furthermore, there is no evidence that funds from abroad which could be driven
by push factors and may therefore not coincide with investment opportunities in the UK are directly
channeled into the housing or the public sector. This also holds for the period prior to the financial
3“Other domestic financial institutions” in this context are UK resident banks and non-banks other than the UK
bank which received the funds directly from abroad.
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crisis and seems to be at odds with the view that a global saving glut led to increased investment in
ostensibly safe assets in advanced economies (Bernanke (2005, 2008)). However, we cannot rule out
that capital inflows into banks have an indirect effect on household lending. We find that capital
inflows boost lending to other resident financial institutions and these institutions could channel
the funds to the non-financial sectors of the economy, such as the household sector. Our evidence
also suggests that much of the foreign capital flows back abroad. This is in line with the finding
of Broner, Didier, Erce, and Schmukler (2013) that capital inflows by foreign agents coincide with
capital outflows by domestic agents. We find that an increase in capital inflows equal to one percent
of a bank’s total liabilities is associated with an increase in the growth of credit to non-residents by
around 1.3 percentage points.
Our finding that capital inflows are channeled to non-financial firms and to other domestic
financial institutions is driven by the pre-crisis period. Capital inflows in the post-crisis period were
not associated with higher domestic credit growth. The effect of capital inflows on lending to foreign
counterparties for our post-crisis sample is more than twice the size of the effect for the pre-crisis
sample. This suggests that after the crisis banks reallocated additional funds from abroad away from
domestic lending and to non-resident lending. The insignificant effect of capital inflows on lending
to the domestic sectors in the post-crisis period is also in line with a move towards market finance
by the UK corporate sector (Financial Policy Committee (2017)) and a decline of the interconnect-
edness between banks after the crisis (Liu, Quiet, and Roth (2015)).
Our paper relates to several strands of literature. First, it contributes to the literature that
has documented the relationship between capital inflows, credit booms and crises at the macro-
level. Cross-country evidence by Mendoza and Terrones (2012); Calderon and Kubota (2012); Lane
and McQuade (2014); Elekdag and Wu (2013) shows that capital inflows are associated with credit
booms. Several studies have highlighted the importance particularly of “other investment” flows
in explaining credit booms (Igan and Tan (2017)) and financial vulnerabilities (Ghosh, Ostry, and
Qureshi (2016)).
Second, our paper relates to the literature studying the effect of capital inflows on lending
to corporates and households. Baskaya, Di Giovanni, Kalemli-Özcan, and Ulu (2017b) match bank
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and firm-level balance sheet data to show that higher global risk appetite as a driver of capital
inflows boosts loan growth and reduces borrowing rates for corporates in Turkey. Igan and Tan
(2017) find that non-FDI inflows are associated with credit booms in both the household and the
corporate sectors. Their firm-level evidence suggests that “other investment” inflows are associated
with faster credit growth for firms that rely heavily on external financing. Samarina and Bezemer
(2016) argue that if foreign capital flows into economies with few investment opportunities, foreign
funding substitutes for domestic bank lending to firms, with banks concentrating on household
lending instead. They provide cross-country evidence showing that capital inflows into the non-
bank sector are associated with lower shares of corporate credit on banks’ balance sheets. Sá,
Towbin, and Wieladek (2014) focus on the housing market instead. Their VAR estimations show
that capital inflow shocks into OECD countries are associated with increases in credit to the private
sector and residential investment, and with higher house prices.
Our paper is also related to the micro banking literature on the cross-border transmission of
funding shocks during times of crisis. Schnabl (2012) exploits the Russian default of 1998 to examine
how shocks to the balance sheets of banks that borrowed internationally affected firm lending in Peru.
There is also an extensive literature studying the cross-border transmission of shocks to banks’
funding and capital during the recent financial crisis and its effect on domestic credit markets (see
for example Aiyar (2011); Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012); Popov and Udell (2010); Ongena, Peydro,
and Van Horen (2015); Buch, Koch, and Koetter (2018)). The study most closely related to ours is
Aiyar (2011). Aiyar (2011) examines the effect of the foreign funding shock to UK banks’ balance
sheets during the global financial crisis. The evidence provided by Aiyar (2011) suggests that this
shock led to a reduction in lending to firms and other financial institutions but in line with our
results, Aiyar (2011) does not find an effect on household credit.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, our paper tracks foreign capital sys-
tematically across all sectors of the economy. This comprehensive assessment of the allocation of
credit allows us to draw conclusions about sectors that may be prone to credit booms during inflow
episodes and that may suffer from funding shortfalls when foreign capital is withdrawn. Second, we
introduce a novel instrument for capital inflows. Our instrument allows us to study the effect of
variation in funding from abroad during both crisis and normal times. We can therefore go beyond
an analysis of the relationship between funding shortfalls and credit crunches during financial crises
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and also examine inflow surges and credit booms.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces our estimation
methodology and explains the instrument. We discuss our data and show descriptive statistics in
section 3. Our results are presented in section 4 and we discuss the robustness of our results in
section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. Methodology
2.1. Regression setup
To assess how inflows of foreign capital affect bank lending to different sectors, we estimate
the following specification:
4lnCb,t = β capital inflows b,t
total funding b,t−1
+ θ demand b,t + γ bank b,t−1 + δt + νb + b,t (1)
where 4lnCb,t is the change in the log of outstanding loans of bank b to a sector between
year-quarter t and (t−1), and capital inflows b,t are inflows of foreign capital into bank b over the quarter
scaled by the bank’s total liabilities in (t− 1). Demand b,t is a vector of time-varying controls for
credit demand faced by bank b and bank b,t−1 is a vector of lagged balance sheet characteristics. νb
and δt are bank and time fixed effects, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level
to account for serial correlation within banks.
We run separate regressions for lending to the household sector, private non-financial cor-
porations (PNFCs), other domestic financial institutions including both banks and non-banks, the
public sector, the domestic economy as a whole and for lending to non-residents. In the robustness
section, we also show results using a broader definition of credit which encompasses both loans and
security holdings.
The main variable of interest is inflows of foreign capital into a UK bank between t and t−1
scaled by its total liabilities. The β-coefficient provides an estimate of the percentage change in
outstanding credit to a sector in response to capital inflows equal to one percent of a bank’s total
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liabilities.
Regressions of credit growth on capital inflows could suffer from endogeneity problems. For
example, improvements in investment opportunities and higher expected future returns which are
difficult to control for could attract foreign funding and simultaneously drive bank lending. Banks
could also anticipate higher demand for credit and attract foreign deposits in order to meet this
demand.
We address these endogeneity concerns in several ways. First, our regressions include year-
quarter fixed effects to capture omitted variables that could affect both capital inflows and bank
lending. The fixed effects capture macroeconomic developments such as business cycles, interest rate
and exchange rate movements, or regulatory changes faced by all banks in our sample. Since we
run separate regressions for lending to each sector of the economy, variation in sector-specific credit
demand or in investment opportunities is also absorbed by the fixed effects. Second, we control
explicitly for credit demand faced by individual banks from each sector given the composition of
their loan portfolios. This is explained in section 2.3. Finally, we instrument for capital inflows
using a Bartik shift-share instrument.
2.2. Bartik instrument for capital inflows
Granular data about the country of origin of foreign capital deposited with banks in the UK
each quarter allow us to construct a Bartik shift-share instrument for capital inflows into a bank.
Our instrument uses information about the historical distribution of funding from a foreign country
across UK banks to allocate subsequent capital inflows from this country across recipient banks
in the UK. This type of instrument has been widely used in the immigration literature to predict
inflows of migrants into different cities of a host country based on historical settlement patterns
of immigrants (Card (2005); Cortes (2008); Sá (2016)). The immigration literature exploits the
persistence of the locational choices of migrants from different countries over time. Similarly, our
instrument builds on the idea that there is persistence in foreign depositors’ choices of UK banks
when they deposit money in the UK.
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Formally, our instrument for inflows of foreign capital into bank b in quarter t is constructed
as follows
capital inflows b,t =
C∑
c=1
(share c,b ∗ capital inflows c,t) (2)
where t > 2000Q4 and
share c,b =
1
12
T=12∑
t=1
foreign deposits c,b,t
foreign deposits c,t
where 1998Q1 ≤ t ≤ 2000Q4.
Thus, calculating the instrument involves three steps. First, we calculate the share c,b, i.e. the
historical share of country c’s total deposits in the UK that is deposited with bank b. Since the ratio
of foreign capital deposited with a bank may vary from quarter to quarter, we average the ratio over
an initial period which we define as the first three years of our sample period i.e. the 12 quarters
from 1998Q1 to 2000Q4. In a second step, we multiply the share c,b during the initial period with
total inflows of foreign deposits from country c into the UK banking sector during quarter t in later
years.4 Thus, the instrument uses the historical distribution of the stock of foreign deposits from
some country c across UK banks to allocate capital inflows from c in subsequent quarters across UK
banks. Finally, we obtain a measure of the aggregate capital inflows into bank b in quarter t by
summing across capital inflows from all countries c.
The initial share has predictive power for the subsequent allocation of foreign funds across
UK-resident banks due to branching networks of particular UK banks in certain foreign countries
which may induce investors abroad to choose these UK banks over others, and due to sticky relation-
ships between foreign depositors and their banks of choice in the UK. The persistence of historical
bank-depositor relationships is also explained by global group structures which facilitate intragroup
flows between entities of the same group operating both abroad and in the UK. Positive and signifi-
cant coefficients from first stage regressions for equation (1) confirm that our instrument is relevant
(Table 2). The Kleibergen-Paap first stage F-statistics in our IV regressions are above the rule-
of-thumb value of 10 and point to a strong instrument (Staiger and Stock (1997); Stock and Yogo
4Note that the initial share and the inflows of country c are calculated using stocks and flows of country c’s total
deposits with the UK banking sector, including with banks that are not part of our regressions sample.
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(2002)).
The validity of the capital flow instrument rests on the assumption that the factors deter-
mining the foreign investors’ choice to deposit their capital with bank b rather than bank b’ during
the initial period 1998Q1-2000Q4 are uncorrelated with differences in loan growth of bank b and
b’ in subsequent quarters. If this exclusion restriction holds, the historical distribution of a coun-
try’s deposits across UK banks only influences lending growth of these banks through its effect on
current capital inflows. Furthermore, we require total inflows of foreign capital from country c into
the entire UK banking sector to be exogenous to the lending activity of an individual bank b. For
example, differential shocks in credit demand of a particular sector faced by a bank at time t should
be uncorrelated with the total inflow of capital from some country c. This assumption is plausible
unless particular countries deposit only with one or very few UK banks so that the total inflows from
some countries into the UK as a whole are equivalent to the inflows received by individual banks.
This is not the case: On average, a country transacts with 36 financial institutions in the UK during
each quarter. Large, advanced countries such as the United States transact with as many as 250 UK
banking entities during a quarter. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that capital inflows from
a particular country are driven by country-specific push factors and UK-wide pull factors which are
not specific to the lending behaviour of individual banks in our sample.
2.3. Controls for credit demand and bank characteristics
In addition to including time fixed effects and instrumenting for capital inflows to capture a
credit supply response, we also control directly for variation in credit demand faced by individual
banks. By including the vector demand b,t in equation (1) we address concerns that banks facing
higher credit demand could attract more capital inflows to meet this demand. As in Aiyar (2011)
and Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek (2014), our demand measures exploit differences in the sectoral
composition of banks’ loan portfolios. For each bank, we construct measures of loan demand by
firms, the household sector, and the rest of the world by combining a bank’s lagged exposure to a
sector with a measure of activity growth for the sector. Banks with larger pre-determined exposures
to a sector should experience more credit demand when activity in that sector picks up. The activity
of the sector should be exogenous to lending by individual banks unless credit provision to a sector
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is dominated by particular banks.
To capture credit demand by businesses, we include the term
z b,t =
12∑
i=1
sib,t−4emp
i
t (3)
, where s denotes the lagged share of bank b’s outstanding credit to industry i divided by
the bank’s total assets in (t− 4). This share is multiplied by employment growth empit in industry i
between t and (t− 4). Exposures to businesses are broken down into twelve non-financial industries
and corporate credit includes credit to both privately owned and public companies. We therefore
capture the demand from PNFCs and some of the demand from the public sector. Employment
growth serves as a proxy for the expansion of real activity in an industry.
We follow a similar approach to proxy for credit demand by non-residents and households.
Since household debt in the UK is dominated by mortgages and house prices drive loan size (Cloyne,
Huber, Ilzetzki, and Kleven (2017)), we proxy for credit demand of households by multiplying the
share of household loans in banks’ total assets with house price growth between t and (t − 4). To
capture foreign demand we multiply outstanding credit to non-residents of a bank as a share of total
assets with world GDP growth.5
Bank b,t includes a set of balance sheet characteristics that could affect a bank’s willingness
or ability to rely on foreign funding to expand its loan portfolio and its preferences when lending to
sectors with different risk-return and maturity profiles. As is standard in the literature, we control
for bank size as measured by the log of total assets. We also control for the ratio of liquid assets
to total assets to capture a bank’s ability to adjust its balance sheet in times of stress. Finally, we
include the leverage ratio as measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets and the share of
core, domestic deposits in total liabilities to take account of the stability and cost of bank funding.
Baskaya, Di Giovanni, Kalemli-Özcan, and Ulu (2017b) have shown that better capitalized banks
with higher non-core liabilities increase credit supply more in response to capital inflows.
5To capture foreign demand we use world GDP growth rather than employment growth which is not available for
the world. A suitable measure of loan demand by other financial institutions is difficult to find and is omitted here.
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3. Data and descriptive statistics
3.1. Data sources and variable construction
We use quarterly bank balance sheet information collected through the Bank of England’s
regulatory reporting forms.6 Data are sourced from different reporting forms and merged to construct
a quarterly panel dataset for the period from 1998Q1 to 2016Q4.7 Although all financial institutions
which are authorised to accept deposits in the UK report to the Bank of England, our sample
does not cover the entire UK banking sector due to threshold requirements for reporting individual
balance sheet items. Our sample only includes banks with relatively large external liabilities. This
is because banks with external liabilities below £ 300 million are not required to report the detailed
breakdown of their liabilities by counterparty country that we use to construct our instrument.
Institutions which did not report this information for the years 1998Q1-2000Q4, the period over
which the historical share of the instrument is calculated, and institutions which did not survive
over the sample period are excluded from our sample. Finally, we exclude four banks which do not
lend to the UK real economy. We end up with a sample of 59 deposit taking institutions.8 The
major banks which account for the bulk of outstanding credit to the UK real economy are included
in our sample.
Our dependent variable is the change in the log of a bank’s outstanding loans to a sector at
the end of the quarter. We distinguish between bank lending to the household sector, private non-
financial companies, the public sector, other domestic financial institutions including both banks and
non-banks such as pension funds or insurance companies, and lending to non-residents.9 Detailed
balance sheet data on bank assets allow us to dissect lending to households and corporates further.
We distinguish between different types of loans to households and examine the relationship between
capital inflows and mortgages (i.e. “lending to individuals secured on dwellings”), credit card balances
and other consumer credit separately. For a subset of the banks in our sample, we can compare
6More information on the reporting forms and the reporting requirements is available on the Bank of England’s
website. The bank-level data are confidential and access is restricted.
7See Table A.1 in the appendix.
844 of the banks in our sample are foreign owned and 15 are domestically owned entities.
9Note that the balance sheet data are subject to changes in reporting requirements and institution changes.
For example, securitized assets are only consistently included in the credit statistics as from 2010 when reporting
requirements changed.
12
the results of our lending regressions for the household sector with results using the growth rate
of new loan approvals as the dependent variable. We examine information on the number of loans
approved for house purchases, for remortgaging, and for other purposes. For corporates, we also
present evidence on lending by industrial sector. We examine bank loans to firms by SIC 2007
industrial sectors.
Most of our analysis focuses on bank loans. In the robustness section, we also report results
using a broader definition of bank credit which includes both loans and security holdings of banks.
Our measure of securities consists of equity and debt securities. For the public sector, this includes
holdings of government securities by UK banks. Data on holdings of securities issued by non-residents
are not available and our robustness analysis therefore focuses on residents only.
The main variable of interest in our model are capital inflows. Capital inflows are obtained
by taking the difference between banks’ end-of-quarter external liability positions. Our data on
external liabilities consist of foreign sight and time deposits and liabilities under sale and repurchase
agreements.10 All capital flows are exchange rate adjusted.11
To construct our instrument for capital inflows we use detailed information on the break-
down of the external liabilities of each bank by counterparty country for all reporting banks in the
UK. Thus, total capital inflows from a country (capital inflows b,t in equation (2)) capture all capital
inflows into UK-resident banks and are not limited to inflows into the 59 banks in the regression sam-
ple. Similarly, foreign deposits c,t, the denominator of the share c,b in equation (2), captures all external
liabilities of UK-resident banks and is not confined to the liabilities of our 59 banks.
More details on the construction of the time-varying balance sheet control variables are
provided in Table A.1 in the appendix. We rely on various external data sources to capture activity
in our sectoral credit demand measures. We obtain data on employment growth by industry and
house price growth for the UK from the ONS. World GDP is obtained from the International
Financial Statistics.
To limit the effect of outliers, we winsorize all variables below the first and above the 99th
percentile. Observations with asset growth in excess of 100% are dropped to account for mergers
10This measure omits bonds issued by UK-resident banks because the breakdown of bond holdings by residence of
the investor is not available.
11Foreign deposit stocks in sterling are converted into their original currency at the end of quarter exchange rate
before calculating the change in the stock. The flow is then converted back into sterling using the average exchange
rate over the quarter.
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and acquisitions. We report summary statistics of our variables in Table A.2 in the appendix.
3.2. Banks’ reliance on foreign funding
UK banks rely heavily on funding from abroad. About half of the total liabilities of banks
resident in the UK between 2001 and 2016 were foreign funded. This also reflects the role of the UK
as a global financial centre and the presence of international banks in London. On average, external
liabilities accounted for roughly a quarter of the total liabilities of domestically owned banks and for
roughly 60% of the liabilities of foreign-owned banks. Reliance on foreign funding increased rapidly
in the run-up to the financial crisis, peaked at around 55% of total liabilities in 2008, fell in the
post-crisis years and then stabilized at around 50%.
The sensitivity of bank lending to movements in foreign funding is partly determined by
banks’ ability to offset shocks to their total funding base by adjusting their domestic funding. Banks
could for example keep the size of the balance sheets relatively stable over time if inflows of foreign
capital coincided with a reduction of domestic funding. In this case, we would not necessarily expect
an expansion of banks’ credit supply in response to capital inflows. Conversely, banks would not be
forced to shrink their loan books following the withdrawal of foreign funding if they could make up
for this shortfall by raising additional domestic funding.
To test for substitution effects between domestic and foreign funding, we adapt the method-
ology of Card (2005) and Cortes (2008):
4ln total funding b,t = β capital inflows b,t
total funding b,t−1
+ δt + νb + b,t (4)
Without substitution effects, capital inflows would equal the change in total funding and β
would be one. If movements in capital inflows were exactly matched by offsetting movements in
domestic liabilities we would expect a β-coefficient of zero.
The results in Table 1 suggest that there is some substitution between domestic and foreign
funding but it is far from perfect: The β-coefficient of 0.4 indicates that for every ten pounds that
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UK-resident banks receive from abroad they reduce their domestic funding base by six pounds. This
finding is mainly due to imperfect substitution between capital inflows from foreign banks and do-
mestic funding (column (2)). The coefficient on inflows from non-banks abroad in column (3) is not
significantly different from zero, suggesting that UK banks fully adjust their domestic funding base
to offset funding shocks from foreign non-banks. Overall, these findings indicate that bank lending
should respond to capital inflows although the response could be muted by a partial adjustment of
banks’ domestic funding base.
3.3. Foreign funding and bank lending
The findings of the previous section suggest that UK-resident banks partially adjust their
domestic funding to offset the effect of capital inflows on their total liabilities. This could imply that
the response of total lending to capital inflows is muted. However, the bank’s allocation of credit
across sectors could change even if an inflow of foreign capital into a bank is perfectly matched by
a decrease in its domestic deposits. As the evidence in this section indicates, there is a relationship
between the portfolio composition of banks’ balance sheets and the split of their liabilities into
foreign and domestic funding.
Figures 3 shows how the composition of banks’ loan portfolios varies with their reliance on
foreign deposits. The charts plot outstanding loans as a share of total assets and foreign deposits
as a share of total liabilities averaged over the period 2001Q1-2016Q4 for each bank. As Figure 3a
shows, banks which rely more on foreign funding tend to have more foreign assets and less domestic
loans on their balance sheets. Figure 3b sheds light on the composition of banks’ domestic loan
portfolios. Banks with higher foreign funding shares tend to have slightly smaller corporate and
much smaller household loan portfolios. In fact, outstanding household loans of almost all banks
with foreign funding shares in excess of 50% of their total liabilities amount to less than 1% of their
total assets. Outstanding credit to domestic financial institutions does not vary systematically with
banks’ share of external liabilities. Public sector loan portfolios tend to be small in comparison and
are not shown here.
Figure 4 shows co-movements of capital inflows with net lending by sector. The capital
inflows and net lending are aggregated for the 37 banks in our sample for which we have complete
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data in every quarter throughout 2001Q1-2016Q4. The chart highlights the strong co-movement
between capital inflows and foreign lending during both inflow and outflow episodes. Lending to
corporates also moves closely with inflows, especially in the pre-crisis period. Finally, there is some
co-movement with lending to domestic financial institutions although this is less pronounced in the
early 2000s. There is no apparent relationship between capital inflows and lending to households or
the public sector.
4. Results
4.1. Baseline results
Table 2 presents the results from estimating specification (2) with loan growth for different
sectors of the economy as the dependent variable. We find that an increase in capital inflows equal to
one percent of a UK bank’s total liabilities results in a 0.8 percentage point increase in its domestic
credit growth (column 5). This is driven by lending to firms (column 1) and to other domestic
financial institutions (column 4). A one percentage point increase of capital inflows as a share of
liabilities is associated with a 1.3 percentage point increase in the growth rate of loans to non-
residents. The large coefficient for capital inflows in the foreign lending regressions in column (6)
suggests that much of the foreign funding that is received by UK banks has a transitional character.
We do not find a significant effect of capital inflows on lending to the public sector (column
2) or to households (column 3). The latter suggests that excess funds from abroad which could
not be allocated to domestic firms were not directly channeled into the UK household sector. It
would seem prudent of banks not to use volatile, short-term funding from abroad to fund long-term
mortgages at home. Of course, it is possible that household credit growth was indirectly boosted
by capital inflows: The bank which initially received the capital inflows could lend the funds to
another bank in the UK and this bank could provide credit to the household sector. Our evidence
cannot shed light on these indirect effects of capital inflows on sectoral lending that arise if the bank
which initially received the capital inflows passes the foreign funds on to other domestic financial
institutions. Given the large effect of foreign capital on lending to other UK financial institutions
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shown in column (4) of Table 2, these indirect effects could be substantial.
OLS estimates for Table 2 are shown in the appendix (Table A.3). The coefficients are of
similar magnitude than in the IV regressions and the effect of capital inflows is insignificant in the
regressions for household and public sector lending.
4.2. A closer look at lending to the household and the corporate sectors
Our finding that capital inflows into banks do not drive lending to the household sector is
surprising. In the UK, the large build-up of household debt in the run-up to the financial crisis
which was mostly driven by mortgage lending coincided with rapid accumulation of gross and net
external liabilities by banks. Furthermore, evidence by Sá (2016) and Badarinza and Ramadorai
(2018) shows that foreign investment drove house price growth in the UK. This would imply a link
with household credit growth if these flows had been intermediated by banks in the UK.
To confirm the findings of our household loan regressions, we also estimate the effect of capi-
tal inflows on different types of household credit and we test whether capital inflows drive household
loan approvals. Columns (1) to (3) of Table 3 show that the effect of capital inflows on mortgage loan
growth, credit card lending growth and other consumer credit growth is not significantly different
from zero. We provide evidence on household loan approvals for the 18 UK banks for which data on
approvals are available in columns (4) to (6). We do not find a significant effect of capital inflows
on growth rates of loan approvals for housing or remortgaging. Only the effect of capital inflows
on approval rates of “other loans” is large and significant. The small size of many of these loans
could explain why this finding is not mirrored by the consumer credit growth results in column (3).
More aggregate measures of household debt are dominated by mortgage lending and the lack of a
significant effect on this category drives overall results. Overall, these results support our previous
finding that capital inflows do not drive lending to the household sector. As before, we cannot rule
out that capital inflows have an indirect effect on household debt as foreign funds could be channeled
through the domestic financial system before reaching the household sector.
Table 4 provides more detail on the positive relationship between capital inflows and lending
to corporates that we have document in the previous section. We assess the effect of capital inflows
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on lending to each industrial sector in the UK, with the exception of the financial sector and the
public administration and defence sectors. Our evidence suggests that only the construction sector
benefits from capital inflows. The coefficient on capital inflows is large and significant: Our esti-
mates suggest that an increase in capital inflows equal to one percent of total liabilities results in
a 12 percentage point increase of credit growth to the construction industry. This is in line with
anecdotal evidence that extending credit quickly to new borrowers, especially smaller companies, can
be challenging, but that lending to large property developers can be scaled up relatively fast. The
negative coefficient in column (9) suggests that capital inflows are associated with a slower rate of
new lending relative to repayment in professional services and could point to a reallocation of credit
between sectors. Lending to manufacturing and other UK sectors does not vary systematically with
capital inflows into UK banks.
4.3. Results for different sample periods and for capital inflows from different
foreign counterparties
In this section we explore whether capital inflows into UK-resident banks had a different
effect in the pre and the post-crisis periods given that financing patterns of the real sector and
financial regulation changed after the financial crisis. We also shed light on the effect of capital
inflows from different types of foreign counterparties.
First, we test whether credit growth in response to capital inflows differs during the pre and
the post-crisis period. Our sample for the pre-crisis period consists of the years 2001-2007 and our
sample for the post-crisis period of the years 2011-2016. Our evidence for the pre-crisis period in
Table 5 confirms our previous findings that capital inflows were associated with more lending to
firms, domestic financial institutions and non-residents. For the post-crisis period we only find a
relationship between foreign funding and lending to non-residents.
The finding that foreign funding does not drive corporate credit growth in the post-crisis
period is in line with a general move towards market based finance in the UK. Since the crisis, nearly
all net finance raised by private non-financial corporations has been through the issuance of tradable
securities, and most of this through corporate bond issuance (Financial Policy Committee (2017)).
Our estimates for lending to other domestic financial institutions are also in line with UK-wide trends
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of direct banking sector interconnectedness. As Liu, Quiet, and Roth (2015) show, banking sector
interconnectedness grew rapidly in the run-up to the crisis but has been falling since, possibly due to
a reduction in risk appetite and regulatory initiatives. This includes the tightening of limits for large
exposures between global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) and the use of interconnectedness
as one of the indicators for identifying G-SIBs which are subject to stricter regulation. Growth rates
of UK banks’ lending to and borrowing from other banks and financial institutions have mostly been
negative since 2008.
Next, we test whether the lending behaviour of UK banks differs depending on whether the
counterparty abroad is a bank or not. Flows from foreign banks are larger than flows from non-
banks and they drive total inflows into UK-resident banks. Flows from foreign banks are also more
volatile and do not co-move with flows from non-banks, possibly because they are not driven by
the same underlying factors. Given these differences in the timing and the characteristics of the
flows, recipient banks in the UK may not deploy these funds in the same way. Table 6 shows results
from estimating equation (1) for inflows from non-resident banks only. In line with our findings for
total capital inflows the results suggest that inflows from foreign banks are associated with lending
to firms, financial institutions in the UK and with lending to non-residents. The magnitude of the
coefficients is similar to the regressions for inflows from all foreign counterparties in Table 2. If we
repeat the analysis for flows from non-banks we do not find a significant effect on credit growth. This
suggests that the sensitivity of credit growth to capital inflows is mostly driven by bank-to-bank
flows.
5. Robustness
In this section, we test the sensitivity of our instrumental variable results to a lengthening
of the time horizon over which the share c,b, i.e. the historical distribution of foreign deposits from a
country across UK-resident banks, is calculated. We also show evidence using a broader definition
of credit growth based on both loans and security holdings.
The share of foreign deposits from a country that are deposited with bank b in the UK deter-
mines how the instrument allocates subsequent capital inflows from that country. The instrument
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used in the IV regressions thus far is based on a share c,b which is calculated for the period from
1998Q1-2000Q4, as defined in equation (2). Since capital inflows that are deposited with UK banks
vary over time, also due to changes in countries’ relative economic strength and financial openness,
we experimented with different horizons over which foreign deposit shares are calculated. The results
in Table 7 show that estimates are robust to a lengthening of the share horizon to a five year period,
from 1998Q1 to 2002Q4.
In Table 8, we provide evidence using credit growth based on both loans and security hold-
ings as a dependent variable. This broader measure is available for funding of firms, the public sector
and other domestic financial institutions. UK banks’ security holdings are particularly large relative
to loans for the public sector. The insignificant coefficient in column (2) suggests that capital inflows
do not have an effect on bank lending to the public sector even when government bond holdings are
taken into account. The effect of capital inflows on corporate loans turns insignificant when we use
this broader measure of credit growth but the benchmark finding that capital inflows boost credit
growth for other domestic financial institutions is confirmed.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we trace out the path of foreign capital to the individual sectors of the UK
economy. We assess where banks that are recipients of large amounts of foreign funding channel
foreign capital using a novel instrument for capital inflows. Our results suggest that capital inflows
have a significant positive effect on domestic credit growth despite the fact that banks cushion
foreign funding shocks by adjusting their domestic funding base and channel funds back to foreign
counterparties. Our evidence reveals that capital inflows into banks drive lending to the corporate
sector and to other domestic financial institutions. The finding that foreign capital flows to the
corporate sector is due to bank lending to the construction industry.
We do not find a significant effect of capital inflows on direct lending to the public sector or
households. However, we cannot rule out that lending to these sectors is indirectly driven by foreign
capital. Banks which are the initial recipients of foreign funding pass the funds on to other domestic
financial institutions and these institutions could channel the funds to non-financial sectors.
20
Our finding that capital inflows boost domestic credit growth is driven by the pre-crisis
period. In the post-crisis period, the effect of capital inflows on lending to non-residents increases
and the effect on domestic lending turns insignificant. In line with a move towards market finance
by corporates and a decline in the interconnectedness of financial institutions, we do not find a
relationship between capital inflows and bank lending to corporates or other domestic financial
institutions in the years after the financial crisis.
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Figure 1
External Assets and Liabilities of UK Financial Institutions
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Note: End of quarter external liabilities, external assets and net assets shown as a
share of annualised GDP. MFIs are monetary financial institutions.
Figure 2
Gross Other Investment Inflows into UK Financial Institutions
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Figure 3
Foreign Funding and the Composition of Banks’ Loan Portfolios
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Note: Bank loans as a share of total assets and foreign deposits as a share of total liabilities averaged over the
period 2001Q1-2016Q4 across all banks.
Figure 4
Co-movements of Capital Inflows and Lending by Sector
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Table 1
Substitution between Domestic and Foreign Funding
(1) (2) (3)
Inflows/Funding 0.365***
(0.0463)
Bank inflows/Funding 0.397***
(0.05)
Non-bank inflows/Funding 0.166
(0.111)
Year-quarter FE yes yes yes
Bank FE yes yes yes
Observations 3332 3332 3332
R-squared 0.147 0.145 0.115
Number of banks 59 59 59
Change log        
total funding
Change log        
total funding
Change log        
total funding
Note: This table reports the results from estimating equation (4) for the period from 2001Q1 to 2016Q4. It shows
the results from OLS regressions of the change log of banks’ total liabilities between quarter t and (t-1) on capital
inflows over the quarter t divided by total liabilities in (t-1). The explanatory variables are total capital inflows into
UK bank b as a share of bank b’s total liabilities (column 1), inflows from non-resident banks into UK bank b as a
share of total liabilities of UK bank b (column 2) and inflows from non-resident non-banks into UK bank b as a share
of total liabilities of UK bank b (column 3). Standard errors clustered by bank are shown in parentheses. *, ** and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2
The Effect of Capital Inflows on Lending by Sector
Non-residents
PNFCs Households Public sector Financial inst. All residents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inflows/Funding 0.744** -0.16 -1.112 1.417*** 0.783** 1.273***
(0.367) (3.55) (3.364) (0.472) (0.332) (0.273)
Assets 0.018* 0.0001 -0.003 -0.019 -0.004 -0.002
(0.011) (0.062) (0.076) (0.015) (0.007) (0.007)
Core deposits 0.016 0.143 -0.322 -0.074 -0.061 -0.011
(0.133) (0.462) (0.487) (0.108) (0.055) (0.066
Liquid assets 0.01 0.166 -0.023 0.077 0.044 -0.043
(0.044) (0.297) (0.469) (0.072) (0.043) (0.029)
Leverage -0.16 0.243 2.246*** -0.239* -0.066 0.222***
(0.161) (0.423) (0.841) (0.123) (0.088) (0.063)
Demand industry -0.084 0.495 -16.99 -1.543 0.394 1.73
(1.449) (11.2) (14.63) (2.797) (1.254) (1.694)
Demand households 1.041*** 2.614 -1.473 1.064* 0.619** 0.363
(0.275) (2.09) (2.844) (0.565) (0.283) (0.291)
Demand world 0.246 -2.836 -19.75* 0.743 0.533 -1.723***
(0.705) (6.48) (11.22) (1.337) (0.617) (0.61)
Year-quarter FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bank FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 3332 3332 3332 3332 3332 3332
R-squared 0.001 0.020 0.032 0.021 0.049 0.279
Number of banks 59 59 59 59 59 59
First stage coefficent 0.402*** 0.402*** 0.402*** 0.402*** 0.402*** 0.402***
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
F-stat 42.72 42.72 42.72 42.72 42.72 42.72
Residents
Change log loans to 
Note: This table reports the results from estimating equation (1) for the period from 2001Q1 to 2016Q4 using 2SLS.
The dependent variables are the change log of loans to private non-financial corporations (column 1), households
(column 2), the public sector (column 3), resident financial institutions (column 4), the sum of the loans to these four
sectors (column 5) and the change log of loans to non-residents (column 6). All regressions use the instrument for
capital inflows shown in equation (2). The coefficients for the first stage regressions and the corresponding standard
errors are shown in the penultimate row. The last row shows the Kleibergen–Paap F-statistic. Standard errors
clustered by bank are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level, respectively.
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Table 3
The Effect of Capital Inflows on Household Lending and Loan Approval Growth
House purchase Credit card Other House purchase Remortgaging Other All approvals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Inflows/Funding 0.151 0.048 1.132 0.288 -1.515 6.761** -0.365
(0.257) (0.048) (1.988) (0.969) (1.538) (3.102) (0.7)
Assets -0.012 -0.001 -0.074 -0.116*** -0.143*** -0.247 -0.120***
(0.009) (0.001) (0.062) (0.03) (0.042) (0.247) (0.029)
Core deposits -0.055 0.009 -0.053 0.061 0.022 1.185* -0.044
(0.044) (0.01) (0.204) (0.150) (0.146) (0.668) (0.139)
Liquid assets -0.031 0.004 0.358 -0.014 0.041 1.605** -0.049
(0.047) (0.005) (0.258) (0.123) (0.185) (0.645) (0.142)
Leverage 0.147** 0.018 -0.06 -0.133 -0.228* -2.322*** -0.133
(0.075) (0.019) (0.393) (0.144) (0.126) (0.87) (0.108)
Demand industry 1.033 0.706** -2.872 1.571 -1.193 -24.11 0.507
(1.191) (0.276) (5.879) (4.619) (5.623) (15.36) (4.179)
Demand households 0.646** 0.252*** 4.026*** 0.11 -0.461 3.573 -0.132
(0.27) -0.078 (1.289) (0.695) (1.163) (3.278) (0.614)
Demand world -0.048 0.089 -5.289 2.37 0.623 28.14** 0.263
(0.819) (0.125) (3.794) (2.621) (3.021) (14.21) (2.525)
Year-quarter FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bank FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 3332 3332 3332 1025 1023 1007 1007
R-squared 0.026 0.078 0.014 0.185 0.047 0.081 0.137
Number of banks 59 59 59 18 18 18 18
F-stat 42.72 42.72 42.72 12.2 12.2 11.92 11.92
Change log household loans for Change log household loan approvals for
Note: This table reports the results from estimating equation (1) for the period from 2001Q1 to 2016Q4 using 2SLS.
The dependent variables are the change log of loans for house purchases (column 1), credit card balances (column 2),
other household loans (column 3), and change log of loan approvals for house purchases (column 4), loan approvals
for remortgaging (column 5), all other household loan approvals (column 6) and the change log of all household loan
approvals (column 7). All regressions use the instrument for capital inflows shown in equation (2). The last row shows
the Kleibergen–Paap F-statistic. Standard errors clustered by bank are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 5
The Effect of Capital Inflows in the Pre and the Post-Crisis Period
Non-residents
PNFCs Households Public sector Financial inst. All residents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Pre-crisis
Inflows/Funding 0.915** 3.683 2.451 2.299*** 1.079*** 0.95***
(0.397) (5.871) (5.079) (0.771) (0.394) (0.295)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year-quarter FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bank FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1487 1487 1487 1487 1487 1487
R-squared -0.025 0.006 0.037 -0.028 -0.003 0.216
Number of banks 55 55 55 55 55 55
F-stat 31.61 31.61 31.61 31.61 31.61 31.61
Panel B: Post-crisis
Inflows/Funding 0.779 0.795 -5.594 0.282 0.539 2.436***
(0.571) (5.381) (5.783) (1.106) (0.553) (0.576)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year-quarter FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bank FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1246 1246 1246 1246 1246 1246
R-squared 0.003 0.017 0.022 0.074 0.093 0.111
Number of banks 57 57 57 57 57 57
F-stat 10.61 10.61 10.61 10.61 10.61 10.61
Residents
Log change loans to 
Note: This table reports the results from estimating equation (1) for the period from 2001Q1-2007Q4 (panel A) and
the period from 2011Q1-2016Q4 (panel B) using 2SLS. The dependent variables are change log of loans to private non-
financial corporations (column 1), households (column 2), the public sector (column 3), resident financial institutions
(column 4), the sum of the loans to these four sectors (column 5) and the change log of loans to non-residents (column
6). All regressions use the instrument for capital inflows shown in equation (2). The last row of each panel shows
the Kleibergen–Paap F-statistic. Standard errors clustered by bank are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 6
The Effect of Capital Inflows from Foreign Banks on Lending by Sector
Non-residents
PNFCs Households Public sector Financial inst. All residents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bank inflows/Funding 0.883*** -0.567 -1.14 1.543*** 1.005*** 1.257***
(0.294) (3.166) (3.497) (0.429) (0.245) (0.228)
Assets 0.018* -0.0002 -0.003 -0.018 -0.003 -0.002
(0.011) (0.062) (0.076) (0.015) (0.007) (0.008)
Core deposits 0.031 0.147 -0.347 -0.044 -0.047 0.019
(0.13) (0.42) (0.478) (0.1) (0.048) (0.058)
Liquid assets 0.025 0.146 -0.037 0.099 0.063 -0.029
(0.045) (0.285) (0.477) (0.072) (0.041) (0.032)
Leverage -0.151 0.229 2.237*** -0.224* -0.054 0.231***
(0.163) (0.412) (0.854) (0.127) (0.085) (0.066)
Demand industry 0.145 0.41 -17.31 -1.119 0.643 2.099
(1.409) (11.05) (14.31) (2.912) (1.288) (1.737)
Demand households 1.071*** 2.509 -1.47 1.084** 0.67** 0.347
(0.272) (1.949) (2.97) (0.535) (0.287) (0.343)
Demand world 0.097 -2.788 -19.54* 0.466 0.373 -1.967***
(0.726) (6.495) (11.23) (1.332) (0.603) (0.597)
Year-quarter FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bank FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 3332 3332 3332 3332 3332 3332
R-squared -0.011 0.019 0.033 0.022 0.04 0.201
Number of banks 59 59 59 59 59 59
F-stat 39.08 39.08 39.08 39.08 39.08 39.08
Residents
Change log loans to 
Note: This table reports the results from estimating equation (1) for the period from 2001Q1 to 2016Q4 using 2SLS.
The dependent variables are the change log of loans to private non-financial corporations (column 1), households
(column 2), the public sector (column 3), resident financial institutions (column 4), the sum of the loans to these four
sectors (column 5) and the change log of loans to non-residents (column 6). All regressions use the instrument for
capital inflows as in equation (2) but the share is now calculated using deposits from foreign banks only and capital
inflows from a country only include inflows from banks. The last row shows the Kleibergen–Paap F-statistic. Standard
errors clustered by bank are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% level, respectively.
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Table 7
The Effect of Capital Inflows on Lending using a Modified Instrument
Non-residents
PNFCs Households Public sector Financial inst. All residents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inflows/Funding 0.756** -1.851 -0.462 1.507*** 1.025*** 1.276***
(0.366) (3.813) (3.248) (0.54) (0.375) (0.256)
Assets 0.018* -0.0004 -0.003 -0.018 -0.004 -0.002
(0.01) (0.06) (0.077) (0.015) (0.007) (0.007)
Core deposits 0.016 0.213 -0.348 -0.078 -0.07 -0.011
(0.134) (0.488) (0.506) (0.111) (0.057) (0.067)
Liquid assets 0.01 0.113 -0.003 0.08 0.051 -0.043
(0.044) (0.309) (0.454) (0.072) (0.046) (0.029)
Leverage -0.16 0.203 2.261*** -0.237* -0.061 0.222***
(0.161) (0.428) (0.838) (0.125) (0.088) (0.063)
Demand industry -0.086 0.831 -17.12 -1.561 0.346 1.729
(1.455) (11.04) (14.58) (2.821) (1.286) (1.695)
Demand households 1.045*** 2.156 -1.297 1.088* 0.685** 0.364
(0.277) (2.134) (2.879) (0.572) (0.303) (0.291)
Demand world 0.248 -3.086 -19.66* 0.757 0.569 -1.723***
(0.705) (6.624) (11.17) (1.333) (0.62) (0.607)
Year-quarter FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bank FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 3332 3332 3332 3332 3332 3332
R-squared -0.001 0.017 0.032 0.017 0.024 0.279
Number of banks 59 59 59 59 59 59
F-stat 36.50 36.50 36.50 36.50 36.50 36.50
Residents
Change log loans to 
Note: This table reports the results from estimating equation (1) for the period from 2001Q1 to 2016Q4 using 2SLS.
The dependent variables are the change log of loans to private non-financial corporations (column 1), households
(column 2), the public sector (column 3), resident financial institutions (column 4), the sum of the loans to these four
sectors (column 5) and the change log of loans to non-residents (column 6). All regressions use the instrument for
capital inflows shown in equation (2) except that the share is now calculated for the period 1998Q1-2002Q4. The last
row shows the Kleibergen–Paap F-statistic. Standard errors clustered by bank are shown in parentheses. *, ** and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
35
Table 8
The Effect of Capital Inflows on Broad Credit Growth
PNFCs Public sector Financial inst.
(1) (2) (3)
Inflows/Funding 0.678 2.063 1.002**
(0.432) (4.341) (0.438)
Assets 0.026** 0.05 -0.017
(0.01) (0.062) (0.012)
Core deposits -0.052 -0.065 -0.017
(0.098) (0.727) (0.063)
Liquid assets -0.003 -0.315 0.003
(0.049) (0.496) (0.055)
Leverage -0.086 1.455** -0.141
(0.104) (0.702) (0.118)
Demand industry 0.942 -1.563 -0.814
(1.43) (13.34) (2.533)
Demand households 1.214*** 1.905 0.419
(0.302) (2.497) (0.483)
Demand world 0.651 2.702 0.916
(0.582) (10.84) (1.14)
Year-quarter FE yes yes yes
Bank FE yes yes yes
Observations 3305 3250 3305
R-squared 0.007 0.03 0.033
Number of banks 59 59 59
F-stat 41.19 39.31 38.17
Changelog loans and security holdings to
Note: This table reports the results from estimating equation (1) for the period from 2001Q1 to 2016Q4 using 2SLS.
The dependent variables are the change log of loans and security holdings to private non-financial corporations (column
1), the public sector (column 2) and resident financial institutions (column 3). All regressions use the instrument for
capital inflows shown in equation (2). The last row shows the Kleibergen–Paap F-statistic. Standard errors clustered
by bank are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
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Table A.1
Variable Construction and Sources
Dependent variables 
Growth of loans to PNFC sector Change log of outstanding loans to PNFC sector BE form
Growth of loans to household sector Change log of outstanding loans to household sector BE form
Growth of loans to financial institutions Change log of outstanding loans to financial institutions AL form
Growth of loans to public sector Change log of outstanding loans to public sector BT form
Growth of loans to non-residents Change log of outstanding loans to non-residents BT form
Growth of loans for house purchases Change log of outstanding mortgage loans BE form
Growth of loans for credit cards Change log of outstanding credit card balances BE form
Growth of loans for other household loans Change log of outstanding other household loans BE form
Approval rate, loans for house purchases Growth rate of loan approvals for house purchases IS form
Approval rate, loans for remortgage Growth rate of loan approvals for remortgaging IS form
Approval rate, other loans Growth rate of loan approvals for other advances IS form
Approval rate, all loans Growth rate of loan approvals for house purchases, remortgaging 
and other advances IS form
Growth of loans and securities, PNFC sector Change log of outstanding loans to PNFC sector plus holdings of 
PNFC securities
BE form
Growth of loans and securities, public sector Change log of outstanding loans to public sector plus holdings of 
government bonds BT form
Growth of loans and securities, other domestic 
financial institutions
Change log of outstanding loans to financial institutions plus 
holdings of securities issued by financial institutions
AL & BE forms
Capital inflows
Capital inflows Change of non-resident sight and time deposits and liabilities 
under sale and repurchase agreements
CL form
Bank balance sheet controls
Total liabilities Total assets minus capital BT form
Total assets Total assets BT form
Core deposits Sight and time deposits of UK residents as a share of total 
liabilities
BT form
Liquid assets Sum of cash holdings, government bond holdings and market 
loans as a share of total assets
BT form
Leverage Liabilities as a share of total assets BT form
Demand measures
Industry demand Industry loans as a lagged share of total assets, multiplied by 
industry employment growth
AL form, ONS
Household demand Household loans as a lagged share of total assets, multiplied by 
house price growth
BE form, ONS
World demand Foreign loans as a lagged share of total assets, multiplied by 
world GDP growth
BT form, IFS
UK real GDP growth Real GDP growth, CVM NSA ONS
Variables Definition Source
Note: The source refers to the regulatory reporting forms of the Bank of England.
The forms can be downloaded at:
www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/data-collection/osca/forms-definitions-validations.
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Table A.2
Summary Statistics
Mean Median St.dev.
(1) (2) (3)
Change log of loans to 
PNFCs 0.006 0 0.224
Households -0.034 0 2.167
Public sector -0.007 0 3.699
Financial inst. 0.022 0 0.468
All residents 0.017 0.008 0.231
Nonresidents 0.014 0.008 0.211
Capital inflows
Inflows/Funding 0.009 0.001 0.085
Instrument 0.006 0.002 0.036
Bank balance sheet controls
Log of assets 10.212 9.952 1.476
Core deposit ratio 0.247 0.144 0.249
Liquid asset ratio 0.391 0.364 0.228
Leverage ratio 0.926 0.958 0.1
Demand measures for
Industry 0.001 0.0002 0.003
Households 0.006 0 0.015
World 0.015 0.014 0.011
Note: This table shows the sample averages, medians and standard deviations of the main variables used in our
analysis for the period 2001Q1-2016Q4. The dependent variables are the change log of loans to private non-financial
corporations (PNFCs), households, the public sector, resident financial institutions, loans to all residents and loans
to non-residents. The main explanatory variable is the ratio of capital inflows between quarter t and (t-1) and bank
liabilities in (t-1). We instrument for capital inflows as shown in equation (2) and scale the measure by bank liabilities
in (t-1). Bank balance sheet variables are the log of total assets, the ratio of core deposits to liabilities, the ratio of
liquid assets to total assets and the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. The construction of the demand measures
is explained in section 2.3.
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Table A.3
Baseline Results estimated using OLS
Non-residents
PNFCs Households Public sector Financial inst. All residents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inflows/Funding 0.17** -0.559 0.387 0.662*** 0.487*** 1.225***
(0.072) (0.516) (0.814) (0.148) (0.072) (0.078)
Assets 0.018 -0.00002 -0.005 -0.019 -0.004 -0.002
(0.012) (0.063) (0.079) (0.015) (0.007) (0.008)
Core deposits 0.04 0.159 -0.384 -0.043 -0.049 -0.009
(0.121) (0.411) (0.468) (0.096) (0.047) (0.065)
Liquid assets -0.008 0.153 0.024 0.053 0.034 -0.045
(0.049) (0.283) (0.492) (0.066) (0.04) (0.031)
Leverage -0.174 0.233 2.281*** -0.256** -0.073 0.221***
(0.171) (0.406) (0.833) (0.122) (0.09) (0.065)
Demand industry 0.03 0.574 -17.29 -1.393 0.453 1.74
(1.451) (11.27) (14.78) (2.777) (1.28) (1.747)
Demand households 0.886*** 2.506 -1.067 0.86 0.539* 0.35
(0.273) (1.949) (2.687) (0.528) (0.276) (0.293)
Demand world 0.161 -2.895 -19.53* 0.632 0.489 -1.73***
(0.717) (6.665) (11.43) (1.306) (0.625) (0.609)
Year-quarter FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bank FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 3,332 3,332 3,332 3,332 3,332 3,332
R-squared 0.045 0.02 0.033 0.039 0.06 0.279
Number of banks 59 59 59 59 59 59
Residents
Log change loans to 
Note: This table reports the results from estimating equation (1) for the period from 2001Q1 to 2016Q4 using OLS.
The dependent variables are the change log of loans to private non-financial corporations (column 1), households
(column 2), the public sector (column 3), resident financial institutions (column 4), the sum of the loans to these four
sectors (column 5) and the change log of loans to non-residents (column 6). Standard errors clustered by bank are
shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
39
